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MISSED OPPORTUNITY: EXCLUDING
CARBON EMISSIONS MARKETS FROM
COMPREHENSIVE OVERSIGHT
LEO MENSAH*
It is not very often that a Commissioner on the United States
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) makes a reference to
a mythical fire-breathing creature composed of equal parts lion, snake,
and goat.1 One would think that federal regulators spend their time dis-
cussing more important issues. On July 10, 2012,2 when the outspoken
Commissioner Bart Chilton made reference to the chimera,3 he was in-
tending to capture an important regulatory sentiment regarding the
progression of comprehensive regulation and the risks of progressing in
a step-by-step fashion. The CFTC’s July 10th open meeting was held to
provide a final definition for the term “swap”.4 The opaqueness of the fi-
nancial swaps market played a large role in the 2008 financial collapse.
While a concrete definition would help give certainty to the financial
markets, the definition would have wide-ranging effects for the country’s
energy trading markets.5 The CFTC vote resulted in a four-to-one decision
* The author would like to thank his family and close friends for always encouraging him
to pursue his interests, think critically, and enjoy the journey.
1 See Transcript, United States of America Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Open
Meeting to Consider Final Rule on Further Definition of the Term “SWAP,” Final Rule
on the End-User Exception to Clearing, and Proposed Rule to Exempt from Clearing
Certain Swaps by Cooperatives (July 10, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public
/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission11_071012-trans.pdf [hereinafter CFTC
Open Meeting] (stating, “I’m a little concerned that these good forwards, the forwards that
had been used for legitimate purposes, are going to morph sort of chimerical. Remember
the mythological creature with the lion’s head, the goat’s body and the snake’s tail? They’re
sort of going to morph.”).
2 See generally COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, FINAL RULES AND INTERPRE-
TATIONS I) FURTHER DEFINING “SWAP,” “SECURITY-BASED SWAP,” AND “SECURITY-BASED
SWAP AGREEMENT”; II) REGARDING “MIXED SWAPS”; AND III) GOVERNING BOOKS AND REC-
ORDS FOR “SECURITY-BASED SWAP AGREEMENTS,” http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public
/@newsroom/documents/file/fd_factsheet_final.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter
FINAL FACTSHEET].
3 See CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
4 See FINAL FACTSHEET, supra note 2.
5 CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
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to exempt energy forwards from the swap definition,6 thereby exempting
such transactions from the comprehensive swap rules of the Dodd Frank
Act. Commissioner Chilton7 was the only commissioner who publicly
voiced his concern for the exemption.8
Commissioner Chilton’s concern over the energy forward exemp-
tion is more than a fleeting fear, or an overly cautious reaction, because
it stems from an important concern. Market manipulation should be an
ever-present concern for regulatory agencies. Manipulation or fraud in
any form erodes both the confidence of market participants and the in-
tegrity of the markets themselves. The alarming events leading up to the
financial crisis of 20089 lend credence to Commissioner Chilton’s con-
cerns about seemingly small regulatory gaps that can be exploited through
linguistic and financial gamesmanship.10 The chimera is composed of sev-
eral different parts, which makes it difficult to say exactly what it is. The
complexity of nearly unclassifiable financial transactions played a promi-
nent role in the 2008 crash.11 Similarly, energy forward contracts, which
are exempt from CFTC regulations, and energy futures contracts, which
are regulated by the CFTC, share many similar complex components,12
and one contract could very easily be made to look like the other. Al-
though energy forwards were excluded because of specific language with-
in the controlling statutes,13 Commissioner Chilton was worried that, due
6 Id.
7 See generally Commissioner Bart Chilton, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
http://www.cftc.gov/About/Commissioners/BartChilton/index.htm (last visited Mar. 31,
2014) (explaining Commissioner Chilton’s background).
8 See CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1 (“What we’re doing in here, and follow me if you
will, guys, is we are excluding all forwards. An exclusion is different than an exemption.
Yes, an exemption. An exemption is you could still have bells and whistles. So we’re ex-
empting you, but you got to report, you got to do this, whatever bells and whistles we
determine to put on. And exclusion is you’re off the bus. You might say but you just said
that the law said that forwards aren’t on your bus. So why do you have a problem with
it? It’s because of the potential chimerical nature of what the forwards could become.”).
9 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xv, xvi (Jan.
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
10 See id.; see also Gary Gensler, Chairman, Remarks at the CFTC’s Role in Cap-and-
Trade, IETA Symposium (Nov. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Chairman Gensler IETA Remarks],
available at http://www.cftc.gov/pressroom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-17 (“Last year’s
[2008] crisis highlighted all too well how opaque markets can threaten the financial sys-
tem and the American public. There has neither been transparency to the public nor to
the regulators in these markets.”).
11 See Chairman Gensler IETA Remarks, supra note 10.
12 See infra note 59.
13 See CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
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to a language loophole, energy transactions could be subject to manipula-
tion if they were set up as a forward, even though in reality, the contract
was closer to a future contract.14 Such a scheme might allow financial
entities to escape the purview of comprehensive CFTC regulations.
On a broader level, Commissioner Chilton was concerned with the
CFTC’s process of excluding energy forwards and the ramifications that
excluding energy forwards would have on the CFTC’s regulatory frame-
work.15 Specifically, he was concerned that the CFTC might be giving too
much room to energy markets by completely excluding them from the
comprehensive regulations of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),16 and CFTC oversight,17 in-
stead of examining the regulatory needs of energy markets and then
determining the appropriate steps to take. Another option, which was not
fully discussed at the hearing, would have been to keep the markets un-
der the purview of the CFTC and provided a narrow exemption.18 Upon
looking at each market, the CFTC could get a better understanding of the
markets’ susceptibility to manipulation and overall risk profile. However,
by excluding energy forwards, the CFTC may have relinquished regula-
tory control over industries where their comprehensive oversight is nec-
essary.19 The active and proposed carbon markets in the United States
provide a pertinent example of an energy market that will suffer as a re-
sult of the overly broad CFTC exclusion. These markets are an example
of the concerns raised by Chilton and it is the focus of this Note that the
carbon trading markets are exactly the type of market that requires CFTC
oversight to function properly.
When the CFTC adopted its final swap definition, it excluded car-
bon forward transactions from comprehensive CFTC regulation,20 and by
doing so it incorrectly ceded control of a market that should rightfully be
regulated by the CFTC. The decision was not made in a vacuum. At best,
when choosing to exclude the carbon forwards markets from CFTC
14 Id. (describing how the contracts might not be delivered).
15 Id.
16 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
17 Id.
18 Chairman Gensler IETA Remarks, supra note 10 (Gensler echoed these sentiments in
2009, stating that “[i]f Congress decides, however, to exempt transactions with some end-
users from a clearing requirement, that exception should be explicit and narrow.”).
19 Id. (stating, “I believe that comprehensive regulation of OTC derivatives is a critical
component of a well functioning emissions trading market as well.”).
20 See FINAL FACTSHEET, supra note 2.
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regulation, the CFTC incorrectly analyzed the risks associated with the
carbon markets,21 as reported by internal CFTC investigations and other
studies readily available to the Commission. At worst, the CFTC ignored
the warnings that were set forth in the carbon market report,22 and ceded
control over a market that is susceptible to rampant manipulation.23
The Carbon Market Report that was submitted by the Carbon
Market Working Group (“Working Group”)24 was conducted under the
authority of the Dodd-Frank Act for the purpose of determining whether
further regulation was necessary for the proper functioning of current
and proposed carbon markets.25 Because of its specific purpose and ex-
tensive analysis, the carbon market report and its standard of evaluation
should have been treated as a persuasive, if not controlling, report. The
thorough analysis of the risk profile of the carbon market, and the eval-
uation of regulatory oversight for other similar emissions markets, pro-
vides a compelling rationale that contradicts the CFTC’s exclusion. The
Working Group’s recommendation that the CFTC should regulate carbon
markets should have been controlling. The CFTC was wrong to adopt a
final swap definition that excluded the carbon market from its regulation
because the CFTC fallaciously assumed that lack of manipulation now
means that such manipulation will not exist in the future. The current
and proposed carbon markets in the United States are susceptible to
fraud despite their current level of regulations,26 and the Dodd-Frank Act
could have taken steps to rectify current regulatory oversight issues, and
prevent problems in the future; however, the exclusion foregoes the
21 See INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP FOR THE STUDY ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS,
REPORT ON THE OVERSIGHT OF EXISTING AND PROSPECTIVE CARBON MARKETS 3-4 (2011)
[hereinafter REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS], available at http://www.cftc.gov
/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/dfstudy_carbon_011811.pdf.
22 Id.
23 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-851R, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
GOVERNMENT REFORM: CARBON TRADING: CURRENT SITUATION AND OVERSIGHT CONSID-
ERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 3–4 (2010) [hereinafter CARBON TRADING: CURRENT SITUA-
TION AND OVERSIGHT CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS], available at http://www.gao
.gov/new.items/d10851r.pdf (describing the types of manipulation that could occur within
the markets).
24 See REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21 (introductory letter
from Chairman Gensler to Speaker John Boehner).
25 Id. at 3–5.
26 See id. at 20, 21, 24. See generally JOSHUA SCHNECK & JONAS MONAST, DUKE NICHOLAS
INST., FINANCIAL MARKET REFORM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CARBON TRADING, NI R 11-01
(2011), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/financial
-market-reform-implications-carbon-trading-paper.pdf.
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opportunity that the government had to effectively regulate current and
future carbon emissions markets within the United States.27
ROADMAP
This Note will expand upon the concerns that were raised by
Commissioner Chilton by examining the adverse effects that the final
definition will have regarding the carbon markets in the United States,
and provide examples of the chimerical financial transactions that occur
in the carbon cap and trade markets. Specifically, the Note will argue
that proper application of the standard of review, established by the
Working Group,28 requires the CFTC to regulate the cap and trade mar-
kets, and by not regulating the markets the Commission underestimated
the susceptibility of carbon markets to manipulation. The decision also
undermines the purpose and effectiveness of the carbon markets.
The Working Group standard employs a balancing test as well as
a comparative approach.29 In order to properly understand the standard
of review and the implications of the CFTC’s decision, the Note will dis-
cuss the origin and purpose of the carbon cap and trade markets, including
their current regulatory scheme. This Note will also discuss the specific
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that affect the carbon markets and the
statutory authority of the Working Group. By highlighting the important
policies that drove the creation of the Act, this Note will show how those
policies support a regime that would subject carbon forwards to CFTC
regulation. In order to properly understand how to apply the standard (or
how it was misapplied in this case), this Note will also juxtapose the car-
bon emissions market with the regulatory schemes employed by other
emissions markets. In conclusion, this Note will discuss the implications
that the CFTC decision has for the carbon markets in the United States,
and will also look at the options available to correct the mistake.
27 See CARBON TRADING: CURRENT SITUATION AND OVERSIGHT CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY-
MAKERS, supra note 23, at 2 (“Under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) carbon emis-
sions are considered to be an ‘exempt commodity.’ Before Congress amended the CEA in
the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203), derivatives on exempt commodities were eligible for
limited oversight by the primary U.S. commodities regulator, CFTC. They could be traded
between qualified parties on an over-the-counter (OTC) basis generally free from CFTC
regulation. CFTC’s authority over such trading was limited to instances in which CFTC
suspected fraud or manipulation.”).
28 See REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 49–51.
29 Id.
800 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 38:795
The CFTC can assert jurisdiction over carbon emissions to pre-
vent manipulation and fraud.30 Since it made the decision to exclude the
carbon markets, the CFTC must have come to the conclusion that there
was little to no risk of manipulation or fraud, but this is an erroneous
conclusion. Proper application of the balancing test and comparative ap-
proach makes it clear that the CFTC misapplied the standard of review
when it exercised its judgment to exclude United States carbon markets
from its oversight. By applying the standard of review that was estab-
lished by the Working Group, and by looking at the purpose of the Dodd-
Frank Act in conjunction with the shortcomings of the current regulations
for the carbon emissions market, this Note will argue that the CFTC
erred in its decision, and if steps are not taken to rectify the mistake, the
decision will have a negative impact on the functioning of the current and
future carbon emissions markets.
I. CARBON MARKETS AND THEIR PIVOTAL ROLE IN
REDUCING EMISSIONS
A. Responding to the Greenhouse Crisis
Coordinated global efforts to reduce the emission of greenhouse
gases came to a head with the negotiation of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (“UNCED”), also known
as the Earth Summit.31 One of the major subsequent developments of the
Earth Summit was the Kyoto Protocol,32 an agreement between many of
the world’s industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.33
30 See CARBON TRADING: CURRENT SITUATION AND OVERSIGHT CONSIDERATIONS FOR
POLICYMAKERS, supra note 23, at 31.
31 See generally Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The Human Impact on Climate Change,
UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L., May 9, 1992, at 1, available at http://legal
.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ccc/ccc_e.pdf (“Global warming, which is the increase in global average
temperature in the course of the twentieth century, is mostly due to the increase of at-
mospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations caused by human activity; these anthro-
pogenic emissions have increased by 70 per cent between 1970 and 2004.”).
32 See generally Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter
Kyoto Protocol] (“The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The major feature of the Kyoto
Protocol is that it sets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European
community for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.”).
33 Id. (describing the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol).
2014] MISSED OPPORTUNITY 801
The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol was hailed by some of those
involved as one of the greatest achievements of international diplomacy
in the late twentieth century,34 and in order to effectuate the goal of the
UNFCCC,35 the Kyoto Protocol suggests several different methods for
countries to manage their greenhouse gas emissions.36 The United States
is one of the largest producers of greenhouse gases,37 and as a response
to the Kyoto Protocol, the United States—along with several other
countries—implemented many different programs focused on bringing
greenhouse gas emissions in line with the agreement.38
The carbon cap and trade system is one of the carbon reducing
mechanisms that United States implemented to reduce its greenhouse
emissions.39 Over the course of its introduction and implementation, the
cap and trade system has proven to be largely effective.40 “The Interna-
tional Energy Agency said the U.S. has cut carbon dioxide emissions more
than any other country over the last six years.”41 Total United States
carbon emissions from energy consumption peaked at about six billion
metric tons in 2007.42 Since 2007, United States emissions have dropped to
levels similar to the emissions that occurred in 1990.43 The Energy Agency
has projected emissions for this year to be around 5.2 billion tons.44
34 See generally Michael Grubb, Kyoto and the Future of International Climate Change
Responses: From Here to Where?, 5 INT’L REV. ENVTL. STRATEGIES 1 (2004).
35 See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 31, at 1 (“[The] stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.”).
36 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 32 (stating that “[u]nder the Protocol, countries must meet
their targets primarily through national measures. However, the [Kyoto] Protocol also
offers them an additional means of meeting their targets by way of three market-based
Mechanisms. The Kyoto mechanisms are: International Emissions Trading; Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (‘CDM’); Joint implementation (‘JI’). The mechanisms help stimulate
green investment and help Parties meet their emission targets in a cost-effective way.”).
37 See Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange
/ghgemissions/global.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
38 See International Climate Partnerships, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPA
activities/internationalpartnerships.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
39 See REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 4–6; MARK JICKLING
& LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34488, REGULATING A CARBON MARKET:
ISSUES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN CARBON AND U.S. SULFUR DIOXIDE ALLOWANCE
MARKETS, at intro. (2008).
40 See Kevin Begos, CO2 Emissions in US Drop to 20-Year Low, AP IMPACT (Aug. 16, 2012,
10:39 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-impact-co2-emissions-us-drop-20-year-low.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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Although the carbon cap and trade system in the United States
has been successful at curbing carbon emissions,45 the system is not
perfect. As will be discussed later in this Note, there are several threats
that could significantly impact the functionality and efficiency of the cap
and trade system,46 thereby turning this productive emissions reduction
strategy into a floundering and inefficient method of climate control. Be-
cause this is a relatively new system, it makes sense to think that much
of the change has been capturing the low hanging fruit. Now that the
easy changes have occurred, any problems that went unoticed will only
be magnified.
B. Structure and Size of Carbon Markets in the United States
A closer look at structural mechanisms of the cap and trade sys-
tem will make it easier to understand and elucidate the concerns over
the CFTC’s exclusion of the markets from their regulatory oversight.47
The carbon cap and trade system works by setting a limit on the amount
of greenhouse gases that regulated entities are allowed to emit.48 The
mechanisms that make the system effective rely on companies acting in
a rational fashion by providing financial incentives to reduce emissions.
Regulated entities are provided with emissions allowances that deter-
mine the “cap” on their emissions.49 These emissions allowances, or cer-
tificates, are distributed to firms through an auction system or another
allocation process.50
45 See id.
46 See CARBON TRADING: CURRENT SITUATION AND OVERSIGHT CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY-
MAKERS, supra note 23, at 2 (stating, “carbon product trading poses various risks and
challenges that were similar to those found in other commodity markets. For example,
carbon products pose market risk, which is the exposure to losses from changes in prod-
uct prices. Similarly, carbon product markets face the risk of potential manipulation and
fraud. Although no fraud involving carbon products has been identified in the United
States since 2001, carbon products traded in Europe have been part of several fraudulent
activities, including those involving value-added tax violations. Carbon markets could be
significantly affected by political or regulatory changes after implementation of any U.S.
cap-and-trade program, but market observers noted that this risk could be mitigated by
including elements in the program that increased certainty of its duration and features.”).
47 CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
48 PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT:
A SHORT OVERVIEW 1 (2010) [hereinafter CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT],
available at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/carbon-market-design-oversight-brief.pdf.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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The second component of the cap and trade system is an effective
market for trading surplus allowances.51 “Trading provides regulated
firms the flexibility either to reduce their own emissions and sell excess
allowances, or to buy extra allowances they need from other firms. . . .”52
One of the reasons that a cap and trade system is preferred, as opposed
to other traditional forms of regulation, is that it allows for emissions
reductions at the lowest possible cost by incentivizing regulated entities
to reduce their emissions.53 Thus far it seems like incentives have been
properly aligned. The goal for companies is to reduce their costs, and the
benefit of the cap and trade system is that the cost of emissions is tied to
a price that companies can work around. However, “as both the cap and
the number of available allowances is reduced over time . . . the price of
[greenhouse gas emissions] will rise and create a continuing incentive for
firms to find new ways to reduce their emissions”54 or find ways to reduce
the prices they pay for their allowances. This system of incentives will
also allow for a reduction in regulatory costs over time, while simulta-
neously avoiding costs that are associated with traditional regulation
and compliance programs.55 But the reduction in the cap and the increase
in price also changes the incentives of participating companies. The in-
centives change depending on the number of allowances that are avail-
able. At one end of the spectrum allowances are numerous and the market
is robust. At the other end of the spectrum allowances are scarce and costs
of emission are high. Rationality points to the idea that at the high cost
level, incentives to cheat will increase as companies seek to find ways to
lower their costs. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly where the current mar-
kets are on this spectrum, but the goal of the cap and trade program is
to slowly reduce overall allowances; therefore, if the program is success-
ful, it will eventually enter into the high cost end of the spectrum.
C. The Importance of a Well Functioning Market
The carbon cap and trade system consists of an effective system
for creating allowances, but in order for the system to function properly
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 2, 3; see also REPORT ON
OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21 (describing various methods to reduce
carbon emissions).
54 See CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 2.
55 Id.
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and achieve the economic incentives that make it a favorable reduction
mechanism, there must also be an effective market for trading allow-
ances.56 With respect to the markets, CFTC regulation is fundamental
to the success of the emissions reduction program.
Because the trading function of the cap and trade program relies
on markets, it is critical that such market transactions are effectively
regulated.57 “To the extent that the market cannot be manipulated or
distorted, it can best be used for the purpose it was created—to reduce
GHG emissions at the least possible cost to the economy.”58 Lack of reg-
ulation weakens the integrity of current and prospective markets be-
cause it paves the way for manipulation and fraud.59 Manipulation and
fraud have the effect of distorting market prices.60 A cap and trade sys-
tem operating in a market that sends inefficient price signals to its par-
ticipants is less likely to incentivize participants to take appropriate
actions regarding their carbon emissions.61
D. Scope of Market Transactions
As the allowances in the carbon cap and trade market are reduced
over time, the prices of such allowances will likely increase. The theory
underlying the cap and trade system is that as the allowances are re-
duced companies will reduce their emissions as well, but by exempting
the carbon forward contracts that will be traded in the secondary market,
the CFTC has allowed for a minor loophole that could be exploited by
companies seeking alternative means of working within the cap and trade
system. The fear is that language within the current regulations will allow
traders to slip between the regulatory oversight depending on what type
of derivative contract they use as if one contract is truly less open to ma-
nipulation and fraudulent activity. However, both carbon forward con-
tracts and carbon futures contracts are open to manipulation that could
distort the efficiency of the cap and trade markets.
56 Id.
57 See Gary Gensler, Chairman, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Agric.,
Nutrition & Forestry (Sept. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Chairman Gensler Testimony], avail-
able at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/genslerstatement090909.
58 CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 2.
59 See REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 20, 24; CARBON
MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 6.
60 See REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 24.
61 CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 4.
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As the carbon allowances are reduced, derivative trading will
become an increasingly important mechanism to hedge against risk be-
cause “[e]mitters in a cap-and-trade system, such as utilities, will have
concerns about both the volatility and the future direction of allowance
prices, and some will likely look to derivatives as a way to minimize (or
hedge) these concerns.”62 Hedging is a financial strategy that seeks to
reduce the financial risk of a transaction by taking a counterbalancing
position that will offset any losses that occur in the initial transaction.
Hedging, if employed correctly, allows market participants to reduce
their potential losses in any given transaction.63 “For example, if a
[utilities] firm believes it will need additional allowances in the future
and the price at that time will be higher, it might want to purchase
allowance futures [in order to avoid incurring the higher future price].”64
This leads to several types of derivative transactions that will
play a central role in the carbon trading market. This type of secondary
trading will be a crucial strategy employed by companies when the emis-
sions allowances are reduced. The forward contract and the future con-
tract are methods used for hedging against the risk of price volatility.
The features of these secondary market hedging contracts are nearly
identical, with the primary difference being that one contract requires
physical delivery of the commodity.
A forward contract is:
A privately negotiated, individualized cash transaction in
which a commercial buyer and seller agree upon delivery
of commodity at a future date. A price may be agreed upon
in advance, or there may be agreement that the price will
be determined at the time of delivery.65
A futures contract is:
A standardized contract involving an established quantity
of an underlying asset (e.g., an allowance) that will be
physically delivered or settled for cash at a known future
date. The price is determined through the bid and offers
that are made on trading platforms such as regulated
62 Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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exchanges and the price is established at the initiation of
the contract. Futures contracts are cleared through a des-
ignated derivatives clearinghouse. . . .66
Both the forward and futures contract are used for the purpose of buying
a certain asset commodity at a specific price at a certain time. In the
carbon markets, they would be used when one company estimates that
the prices for allowances will increase and chooses to lock in the current
price. The primary differences between the two contracts are that the
futures contract is guaranteed through a clearing house and is typically
a standardized contract. The forward contract is different in that it is
done off of an exchange, and the contract is typically individualized and
not as rigid as a futures contract. The problem is that because the for-
ward contract can be individualized, two parties could easily create an
off exchange forward contract that has all of the characteristics of a fu-
tures contract and escape the purview of the CFTC regulation. That is
the essential impact of exempting forwards from the swap definition.
The essential aspect of swaps, as they were defined at the CFTC
hearing is that they are, “transaction[s] between parties that involve[ ]
an exchange of allowances (or offsets) or other cash-flows in order to
maximize revenue or minimize financing costs for each party.”67 While
a swap contract will typically involve periodic payments, a forward con-
tract will involve a single payment upon the delivery of the underlying
asset. The forward contract could be set up to look like a swap and require
periodic payments. With forward contracts occurring off of exchanges and
outside the CFTC swap regulations, they will lack transparency and be
more susceptible to manipulation and fraudulent activity. In a market
“accurate price signals are the most efficient transmitters of economic
information, as they indicate when supply is either low or high, when de-
mand is robust or weak, and when firms should take notice of longer-
term trends.”68 Therefore it is critical that the market works as efficiently
as possible.69 As a natural extension of its regulatory power, the CFTC
should regulate the carbon forwards market because it is empirically
clear that as allowances are reduced and incentives are changed market
participants will seek ways to reduce their costs in any way possible.
66 Id.
67 CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 4.
68 Id.; see also REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21; Chairman
Gensler Testimony, supra note 57.
69 See REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 7, 20; Chairman
Gensler Testimony, supra note 57.
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E. Concerns That Existed Before the CFTC Exclusion
There are several threats to the market that could significantly
impact the functionality and efficiency of the market.70 Manipulation and
excessive speculation reduce the effectiveness of the system and under-
mine the goals of the Kyoto Protocol.
Efforts to address excessive speculation, price manipulation,
and fraud in recent climate bills include specific prohibitions on manip-
ulation and fraud, position limits, limits on the types of instruments that
may be traded and where trading may take place, limits on the short sell-
ing of regulated allowances, reporting requirements, and restrictions on
market participation.71
Transparency of carbon markets is critical to providing market
participants with accurate price signals that keep the markets operating
efficiently, and recent climate bills have instituted several requirements
to reach this goal. Provisions within these bills seek to increase transpar-
ency by forcing certain transactions to go through an exchange that would
clear the contracts. Certain provisions also require increased record
keeping and reporting requirements for market participants, and other
measures go as far as suggesting the creation of a national market or
automated quotation system for the carbon allowances.72 These proposed
measures that seek transparency share the goal of limiting excessive
price volatility, which occurs as a result of over speculation.73 However,
the swap definition undermines these goals because it allows for the for-
ward contracts to remain off exchanges, thereby reducing the transpar-
ency of the carbon forwards markets.
F. Oversight That Existed Before the CFTC Exclusion
The emissions reduction program is critically dependent on a well-
functioning market, and a well-functioning market is critically dependent
on being free from price distorting activities such as fraud and manipu-
lation. Understanding the current concerns about the carbon markets
puts us in a position to properly understand what should have occurred
70 See generally Boisson de Chazournes supra note 31; REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON
MARKETS, supra note 21; Chairman Gensler Testimony, supra note 57.
71 See generally Boisson de Chazournes supra note 31; REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON
MARKETS, supra note 21; Chairman Gensler Testimony, supra note 57.
72 See SCHNECK & MONAST, supra note 26, at 3.
73 Id.
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at the CFTC exclusion hearing,74 and lends credence to the concerns
raised by Commissioner Chilton.75 Up to the time of the final swap def-
inition, the trend within the regulatory statutes was toward providing
greater oversight. “The majority of climate bills expand regulators’ juris-
diction over allowance and derivative markets. Some bills include specific
definitions of the kinds of financial instruments subject to regulatory
oversight, while others rely on subsequent rulemaking by regulator(s) to
define regulated instruments.”76
The Waxman-Markey ACES bill (H.R. 2454) creates dis-
tinct oversight regimes for allowances and derivatives.
The bill instructs FERC to develop and implement regu-
lations for oversight of the regulated allowance cash mar-
ket. At the same time, an interagency working group would
develop and recommend to the President proposals for
regulating the allowance derivative market. However, the
default rule in the bill would assign oversight of this mar-
ket to the CFTC. The Boxer-Kerry bill (S.1733) included
only placeholder language for market oversight, while
the Carbon Market Oversight Act proposed by Senators
Feinstein and Snowe (S.1399) lays out a comprehensive
regulatory framework.77
The expansion of the emissions markets, the incentives of market
participants, and the growing importance of derivative trading raise le-
gitimate reasons for maintaining regulatory control of the carbon emis-
sions markets with the CFTC. These reasons, which contradict the final
swap definition adopted by the CFTC, have been echoed in several en-
vironmental bills. “While the Markey bill initially proposed creating an
Office of Carbon Market Oversight at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), subsequent bills demonstrate an emerging consen-
sus that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is best
equipped to regulate emissions markets.”78
Oversight provisions in some bills could be interpreted to cover
transactions involving the development of offset projects (i.e., contract
74 FINAL FACTSHEET, supra note 2.
75 See CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
76 SCHNECK & MONAST, supra note 26, at 3.
77 CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 7.
78 SCHNECK & MONAST, supra note 26, at 3.
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sales before a government authority certifies the offset credit as a compli-
ance instrument). “Carbon market bills address the concern by exempt-
ing a narrowly defined category of contracts from exchange and clearing
requirements or allowing the regulator to determine which financial in-
struments are subject to the exchange trading and clearing require-
ments.”79 Commissioner Gary Gensler recognized the legitimacy of these
concerns when he commented at the International Emissions Trading
Association during the 2009 Fall Symposium.80
Unlike futures contracts, which are cleared on an exchange,
forwards contracts would not be subject to the same level of oversight;
therefore there is less transparency and a greater risk of fraud and
manipulation that would undercut the goals of the carbon cap and trade
system.
For a carbon cap and trade system to effectively achieve the goal
of reducing carbon emissions it must be supported by regulations that
allow both the distribution of allowances and the markets on which those
allowances will trade to function effectively. “A well-designed policy should
include effective means to prevent excessively high prices (a political as
well as economic question), extreme price volatility, and it should include
oversight provisions to prevent market manipulation, irresponsible risk-
taking, and other problems.”81 Therefore, as CFTC Commissioner Gensler
previously reported, it makes sense that the CFTC would employ its con-
siderable experience to protect the growing carbon emissions markets.82
79 Id.
80 See Chairman Gensler IETA Remarks, supra note 10 (“I believe that comprehensive
regulation of OTC derivatives is a critical component of a well functioning emissions trad-
ing market as well. As Congress moves forward with potential cap-and-trade legislation,
I believe it should fully regulate the expanded carbon trading markets—including the fu-
tures market, the OTC market and the cash market—without exception. Ensuring trans-
parency, protecting the price discovery function and addressing financial risk are every
bit as critical for emissions markets as other markets.
It is crucial to ensure that carbon markets function smoothly, efficiently and trans-
parently. Effective regulation of carbon allowance trading will require cooperation on the
parts of several regulators. There are six regulatory components of carbon markets that
I believe should be considered:
1. Standard setting and allocation;
2. Compliance with emissions caps and offset requirements;
3. Recordkeeping and maintaining a registry;
4. Overseeing the trade execution system;
5. Overseeing clearing of trades; and
6. Protecting against fraud, manipulation and other abuses.”).
81 CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 2.
82 See Chairman Gensler IETA Remarks, supra note 10 (“The markets should benefit from
the protections that we currently have against fraud, manipulation and other abuses as
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II. APPLYING THE WORKING GROUP TO THE CFTC
DECISION EXCLUSION
A. Purpose of the Working Group
The CFTC decision to exclude carbon market transactions from
the swap definition was not made in an informational vacuum. There
were several reports that expressed the concerns raised by Commissioner
Chilton.83 One such report, which should have been a pivotal part of the
decision making process, was presented by the CFTC’s own interagency
group. “Section 750 of the [Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection] Act established an interagency working group to ‘conduct a
study on the oversight of existing and perspective carbon markets to en-
sure efficient, secure, and transparent carbon markets, including over-
sight of spot markets and derivative markets.”84
The study accomplishes several things. It provides an analysis of
the structure of carbon markets, regulatory oversight of carbon markets,
and methods used to achieve regulatory goals. It examines the existing
and perspective carbon markets and the economic features of carbon
markets that are relevant for analysis of oversight provisions. Finally, it
offers recommendations for effective oversight of carbon markets.85
The group has four overarching objectives that guide its recom-
mendations.86 The guiding objectives are: facilitating and protecting price
directed by the Commodity Exchange Act coupled with any new protections Congress is
considering for the OTC derivatives markets. We also must ensure that all transactions
in both the carbon futures and cash markets are promptly reported and that a central
registry is updated at least on a daily basis. With immediate registry of trades, it will be
easier for regulators to identify manipulation in the markets. It is important that com-
panies are able to make long-term capital commitments and hedge their long-term price
risk of carbon emissions allowances. That is why it is critical to get the regulatory over-
sight right of both the futures markets and the over-the-counter markets that may de-
velop out of a cap-and-trade program.”).
83 CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
84 See REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 3 (“The interagency
group is composed of the following members or designees: the Chairman of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which serves as the Chairman of the inter-
agency group, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Administrator
of the Energy Information Administration (EIA).”).
85 Id. at 22–24.
86 Id.
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discovery in the carbon markets, ensuring appropriate levels of carbon
market transparency, allowing for appropriate, broad market participa-
tion, and preventing manipulation, fraud, and other market abuses.87
These guiding objectives are in line with the policy goals of the Dodd-
Frank Act,88 but stand in direct contrast to the final swap definition
adopted by the CFTC. It makes for poor regulation when the Commission
decides to ignore or misinterprets the very group that was gathered to
give them information on the market. It is even more egregious when one
considers that one of the participants in the study was the CFTC chairman,
and the specialists assembled to conduct the report are highly knowl-
edgeable about the state of the market and the effect of regulations.
The Working Group establishes that one of the primary benefits
of a carbon market is the cost effectiveness of a marketplace that sets the
price for offsets, and also allows the efficient distribution of such offsets.89
This benefit would clearly be reduced if the markets were subject to price
skewing, manipulation, or market fraud.90 The group notes that “[f]or
markets to operate effectively, it is important that they are free of ma-
nipulative and fraudulent activities. In both cases such activity tends to
distort prices, leading to decisions by market participants and end-users
that are not economically efficient.”91 As discussed earlier, economic in-
efficiency has the potential to undermine the entire goal of the cap and
trade system.92
B. The Working Group’s Standard of Review
In determining whether it makes sense for the CFTC to regulate
the Carbon Markets, the Working Group smartly employed both a bal-
ancing test based on factors specific to the Carbon markets and a com-
parative approach based on the regulatory scheme of similar emissions
markets.93 The Working Group largely bases the economic analysis of reg-
ulatory oversight by comparing the carbon emissions market to the mar-
kets for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide.94 The Working Group notes:
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra 21, at 7–8.
90 See id.; Chairman Gensler Testimony, supra note 57; CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND
OVERSIGHT, supra note 48.
91 REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 24.
92 See Chairman Gensler Testimony, supra note 57.
93 REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 30.
94 Id. at 10.
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In most respects, emissions markets operate no differently
than markets for other commodities . . . . This suggests
that the same principles that guide the development of
market oversight provisions for other markets should do
so for carbon markets, [and] the basic features that are
generally necessary to facilitate efficient, transparent, and
secure markets (e.g., robust participation, liquidity, infor-
mation, and effective oversight) are also needed for carbon
markets. The general tradeoffs that should be considered
in establishing the regulatory framework for carbon mar-
kets are the same as are present in other markets.95
With respect to other commodities, the role of regulators is not
only to make sure that such oversight provisions are in place, but also to
make sure that such provisions are effective, and facilitate the underly-
ing policy goals.96
Carbon product trading poses various risks and challenges
that were similar to those found in other commodity mar-
kets. For example, carbon products pose market risk, which
is the exposure to losses from changes in product prices.
Similarly, carbon product markets face the risk of poten-
tial manipulation and fraud.97
C. Comparison to Sulfur Dioxide and Nitrogen Dioxide Markets
In making its recommendation, the Working Group compares the
regulatory scheme of the carbon market to the framework employed by
both the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide emissions markets.98 The com-
parison is appropriate because the emissions programs share similar goals
95 Id. at 30.
96 See id. at 21 (“The objective of market oversight is to ensure that price determination
in a market is accomplished efficiently, fairly, and openly so as to reflect the forces of sup-
ply and demand. To accomplish this, regulators often focus on four areas of concern that
potentially influence how well a market functions. These are facilitation of price discovery,
market transparency, optimal market participation, and prevention of manipulation, fraud
and other abuses.”).
97 See CARBON TRADING: CURRENT SITUATION AND OVERSIGHT CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICY-
MAKERS, supra note 23, at 2.
98 REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 4.
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of lowering emissions,99 and both programs seek to accomplish their goals
through a cap and trade program.100 Because of the similarities between
these markets, the logical conclusion points towards CFTC regulation.
The regulatory framework for the nitrogen dioxide and sulfur
dioxide is split among multiple regulatory agencies. “[T]he EPA currently
issues allowances on sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide under the Acid
Rain [Program].”101 The acid rain program was one of the first emissions
programs to depart from the typical compliance programs and move to
a cap and trade system.102 The NOx trading program also follows the cap
and trade system to allow for a flexible and market based approach to
reducing emissions.103 The Nitrogen program was implemented in 2003
in an effort to reduce the emissions from large power plants and other
large emitters.104
99 See Acid Rain Program, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/arp/ (last visited
Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Acid Rain Program] (“The overall goal of the Acid Rain Program
is to achieve significant environmental and public health benefits through reductions in
emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx)—the primary causes of acid
rain.”); Acid Rain Program Basic Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progs
regs/arp/basic.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (“The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
set a goal of reducing NOx by 2 million tons from 1980 levels. The Acid Rain program
focuses on one set of sources that emit NOx, coal-fired electric utility boilers. As with the
SO2 emission reduction requirements, the NOx program was implemented in two phases,
beginning in 1996 and 2000.”).
100 SO2 Reductions and Allowance Trading Under the Acid Rain Program, EPA, http://
www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/arp/s02.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
101 Chairman Gensler Testimony, supra note 57.
102 Acid Rain Program, supra note 99 (“The Acid Rain Program represents a dramatic
departure from traditional command and control regulatory methods that establish spe-
cific, inflexible emissions limitations with which all affected sources must comply. Instead,
the Acid Rain Program introduces an allowance trading system that harnesses the incen-
tives of the free market to reduce pollution. Under this system, affected utility units are
allocated allowances based on their historic fuel consumption and a specific emissions rate.
Each allowance permits a unit to emit 1 ton of SO2 during or after a specified year. For
each ton of SO2 emitted in a given year, one allowance is retired, that is, it can no longer
be used.”).
103 Acid Rain Program, supra note 99.
104 NOx Budget Trading Program/NOx SIP Call, 2003–2008, EPA, http://www.epa.gov
/airmarkets/progsregs/nox/sip.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (“In 2003, EPA began to
administer the NOx Budget Trading Program under the NOx State Implementation Plan,
also known as the ‘NOx SIP Call.’ The NOx Budget Trading Program (NBP) was a market-
based cap and trade program created to reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) from
power plants and other large combustion sources in the eastern United States. NOx is a
prime ingredient in the formation of ground-level ozone (smog), a pervasive air pollution
problem in many areas of the eastern United States.”).
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For both the sulfur and nitrogen dioxide cap and trade markets
the trading portion is regulated by the CFTC, while the distribution of
the allowances are controlled by EPA and other regulators.105 The CFTC
regulates both sulfur and nitrogen due to a combination of statutory
authority and because these markets fall under the natural purview of
the financial regulators.106 The controls and goals of the sulfur and ni-
trogen markets have many of the same goals as the carbon cap and trade
program.107 Where the CFTC has the expertise it should regulate the mar-
kets, and despite the differences between emissions markets and other
commodities markets,108 the reasoning for CFTC oversight echoes the sen-
timents expressed by CFTC Gary Gensler regarding the carbon markets109
and still points toward CFTC regulation.
The cap and trade program for sulfur emissions also provides a
strong example of how a carbon market should be regulated, because, like
the nitrogen dioxide market, it has many similarities to the carbon emis-
sions program, and when one extends the reasoning that was employed
for the sulfur and nitrogen markets it points toward CFTC oversight.
For the sulfur and nitrogen markets, EPA has traditionally had
oversight of the distribution, auctioning, and transference of the emission
allowances. This is the part of the cap and trade system that EPA and
other environmental regulators have the expertise to manage. With re-
spect to the markets on which the sulfur and nitrogen emissions allow-
ances trade, the environmental regulators are not responsible for their
oversight, because they lack the technical expertise. EPA also lacks the
price reporting mechanism that provides transparency for emissions
105 See generally CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48; Chairman
Gensler Testimony, supra note 57.
106 See CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 6.
107 See REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21; Chairman Gensler
Testimony, supra note 57.
108 See JICKLING & PARKER, supra note 39, at 20 (“In a 2005 Interpretive Letter approving
physically settled emission derivatives transactions, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Administrator of National Banks, states that physical settlement of emission
allowances do not pose the same risk as other physical commodities: The proposed emis-
sions derivatives transactions [e.g., futures, forwards, options, swaps, caps, and floors]
will be linked to three emission allowance markets: the U.S. SO2 (Sulfur Dioxide) and NOx
(Nitrogen Oxide) markets and the European Union’s CO2 (carbon dioxide) market. These
emissions markets are volatile and price fluctuates considerably. Market participants
manage price risk through the use of derivative structures, such as forwards, futures,
options, caps and floors. These derivatives are generally physically settled, because the
current emissions market is primarily physical in nature. . . .”).
109 See Chairman Gensler Testimony, supra note 57.
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market transactions. This is one of the primary reasons why the CFTC
provides oversight for the trading of sulfur emissions.110
EPA does not regulate the trading portion of the cap and trade
system because it lacks the expertise. Because of the similarities between
emissions contracts and other commodities, the emissions programs fall
under the natural purview of CFTC regulation. CFTC Commissioner Gary
Gensler felt that:
In most respects, emissions contract markets operate
similarly to other commodity markets the CFTC regulates.
While each contract—such as sulfur dioxide, wheat, trea-
sury bills or natural gas—presents its own unique chal-
lenges, the regulatory scheme is essentially the same. The
Commission has thorough processes to ensure that ex-
changes have procedures in place to protect market partic-
ipants and ensure fair and orderly trading, that products
are designed to minimize potential manipulation and that
exchanges comply with the law and regulations.111
In addition to their regulatory expertise regarding commodity exchanges,
the Commission also has the adequate staff and compliance mechanism in
place to monitor and enforce these exchanges and the market participants.
Because the Commission has the authority to set position limits for mar-
ket participants, and monitor the markets for signs of manipulation,112
it should not have elected to exempt carbon forwards from its oversight.
The similarities between the sulfur, nitrogen, and carbon emis-
sions markets make CFTC control of carbon markets a natural extension
of its regulatory power.
There are two main trends that are reflected in both the carbon
and sulfur emissions market.113 One of the similarities is a trend toward
increasing market participation from parties not directly related to the
carbon market.114 Another similarity is the increasing use of complex
110 See CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48.
111 Chairman Gensler IETA Remarks, supra note 10.
112 Id.
113 See JICKLING & PARKER, supra note 39, at 1.
114 Id. at 27 (“First, there is a trend toward more diverse, non-traditional participants in
the Title IV market. Like the Title IV market, the economic importance of a carbon mar-
ket will likely draw in entities not directly affected by the reduction requirements, such
as financial institutions. The motivations of these entities may be equally diverse, in-
cluding facilitating projects involving the need for allowances, portfolio balancing, and
profits earned through intermediary fees or proprietary trading.”).
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financial devices to manage the risk associated with allowances through
hedging and other secondary trading activity.115 These trends are also
present in the carbon markets. The similarities between the three emis-
sions markets lead to one conclusion. The CFTC should, at the very least,
manage the market for trading carbon emissions. It has both the statu-
tory authority to do so, and has the benefit of experience when it comes
to managing regulatory oversight of emissions markets. The main differ-
ence between the sulfur and carbon markets is the volume of emissions
produced by a single industry,116 but this difference only highlights the
crucial role that the CFTC would play in protecting the integrity of the
carbon markets.
D. Balancing the Dodd-Frank Act with the Exemption
The Working Group believes that the Dodd-Frank Act will achieve
comprehensive oversight of the carbon derivative market;117 however, the
Working Group makes the distinction between primary and secondary car-
bon derivative markets and how they will be affected by the implementa-
tion of Dodd-Frank. “[P]rimary and secondary carbon allowance and offset
115 Id. (“Second, there is trend in the Title IV market toward using financial instruments
to manage allowance price risk. This trend is partly the result of the regulatory uncer-
tainty introduced in the allowance market by difficulty EPA is having with the Clean Air
Interstate Rule (CAIR). Given the greater economic stakes involved in a carbon market,
this trend toward more sophisticated financial instruments is likely to emerge early as
a hedge against price uncertainty. The emergence of entities well-versed in the use of
these instruments may reinforce the trend and make options, collars, strangles, and other
structures as common in the allowance market as they are in other commodity markets.”).
116 Id. at 22 (“reduction scheme, there are several important differences. For example, the
Title IV program involves up to 3,000 new and existing electric generating facilities that
contribute two-thirds of the country’s SO2 and one third of its nitrogen oxide (NOx) emis-
sions (the two primary precursors of acid rain). This concentration of sources makes the
logistics of allowance trading administratively manageable and enforceable with con-
tinuous emissions monitors (CEMs) providing real time data. However, greenhouse gas
emissions are not so concentrated. In 2005, the electric power industry accounted for
about 33% of the country’s GHG emissions, while the transportation section accounted
for about 28%, industrial use about 19%, agriculture about 8%, commercial use about 6%,
and residential use about 5%. Thus, small dispersed sources in transportation, residential/
commercial and agricultural sectors, along with industry, are far more important in con-
trolling GHG emissions than they are in controlling SO2 emissions. This diversity mul-
tiplies as the global nature of the climate change issue is considered, along with the
multiple GHGs involved. Thus, a carbon market is like to involve far greater numbers of
affected parties from diverse industries than the current Title IV program.”).
117 REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 50–51.
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markets will not be subject to the same comprehensive oversight as de-
rivative markets. Various characteristics of carbon market suggest the
need to consider whether additional regulation is necessary for primary
and secondary carbon allowance and offset markets.”118
Based on the cost of implementing regulations and the costs of
foregoing Dodd-Frank regulations, the Working Group recommended to:
1. Rely on the existing regulatory oversight program, as
enhanced by the Dodd-Frank Act, for both existing and
prospective carbon allowance and offset derivatives mar-
kets. The current legal framework for oversight of deriva-
tive markets, as enhanced by the Dodd-Frank Act when it
becomes effective in July 2011, will provide for robust and
effective oversight of carbon derivatives markets and
closely linked derivative markets, such as those based on
energy commodities.
2. Ensure that appropriate oversight mechanisms are
in place for primary and secondary allowance and offset
markets, reflecting the above objectives and the interde-
pendence of primary, secondary, and derivative carbon mar-
kets, and any unique characteristics or circumstances of
such markets.119
The recommendations provide a strong case for including carbon
markets in the swap definition, and the actions taken by the United
States Commodity Futures Trading Commission are directly contrary to
such recommendations.120 The recommendation is important because the
group must have had access to all or most of the CFTC budgetary infor-
mation and cost benefit analysis. The interagency group’s recommenda-
tion is also supported by Commissioner Gary Gensler’s 2009 report, in
which he states his belief that the CFTC has the expertise to manage the
trading portion of the cap and trade system.121
118 Id. at 51. But see JICKLING & PARKER, supra note 39, at 31 (“Spot market trades, which
would not come under regulation under current securities or commodities law, are an-
other area where abuses could arise from information asymmetries between large, so-
phisticated traders and smaller firms that rarely use the market. The potential for abuse,
however, would be greatly reduced if current price data were easily available to all
market participants.”).
119 REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21, at 51.
120 See CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
121 See Chairman Gensler Testimony, supra note 57.
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E. Dealing with Shortcomings and Exceptions to Dodd-Frank
Although the Dodd-Frank Act would not have perfected the regu-
lations, it would certainly have made them stronger for existing and pro-
spective markets.122 While there is significant overlap between current
laws the Dodd-Frank regulations, there are still areas that are left un-
answered by both Dodd-Frank and the current laws governing the carbon
markets. The areas that are left unresolved include: regulation of the
spot market, regulation of end-user transactions, regulation of offset
credit transactions, and limitations on carbon market participation.123
Even with the shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act, and taking into re-
gard the issues that would still surround the carbon emissions markets,
the benefit to market integrity far outweighs any potential costs.
During the voting on the final swap definition, Bart Chilton rec-
ognized the potential problems with the sweeping exclusion.124 An exclu-
sion differs from an exemption in that when there is an exemption it can
be limited and narrow while still maintaining adequate protections and
“bells and whistles.”125 With an exclusion, the Commission does not have
the same power to attach conditions. Commissioner Chilton feared “the
creation of some chimerical product that is a forward yet has embedded
as part of the contract a commodity option . . .”126 when such an option
should be under the CFTC regulation.
Commissioner Chilton’s comment suggests one of the possible
alternatives that could have been taken by the United States Commodity
Futures Trading Commission. By including carbon derivatives (amongst
other energy derivatives) in the definition of swaps, the Commission
would then be free to offer exemptions to carbon markets if it determined
such exemptions were necessary or appropriate.127 This would allow for
an individual assessment of the risk profile for each market, rather than
treating all markets the same with the broad based exclusion. Although
122 See SCHNECK & MONAST, supra note 26, at 4 (describing the major issues that remain
unresolved by the Dodd-Frank Act including: regulation of the allowance (spot) market,
regulation of end-user transactions, regulation of offsets credit transactions, limitations
on carbon market participation).
123 Id. at 4.
124 CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See id.; REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF CARBON MARKETS, supra note 21.
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this might increase the cost to the CFTC, as noted in the prior section,
the benefit outweighs the additional cost.
The United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission has
the authority to amend the definition.128 This is especially important con-
sidering that there is the potential for additional carbon markets to come
into existence.129 The head of the CFTC, Commissioner Gary Gensler,
held a similar view regarding exemptions prior to the CFTC SWAP def-
inition.130 Gensler felt that “[i]f Congress decides, however, to exempt
transactions with some end-users from a clearing requirement, that ex-
ception should be explicit and narrow,”131 but the current swap definition
that exempts forwards is the opposite of Gensler’s view.
F. Further Justification for the Balancing Test and
CFTC Regulation
As part of the balancing test, the CFTC should take into account
the potential for abuses that may arise in a carbon market not subject to
extensive regulatory oversight.132 Although there have not been any sig-
nificant instances of manipulation in the carbon emissions markets, the
potential for abuse in the carbon markets is substantiated by the abuses
that have occurred in other energy markets as a result of deregulation.133
The most noteworthy and infamous example of manipulation that
occurred at Enron. Although much of the fraud was the result of faulty
accounting practices, the deregulation of the California energy markets
laid the groundwork for Enron’s market manipulating practices. “The
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 deregulated the market
for energy futures,” and created the Enron Loophole.134 This deregulation
128 See CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
129 See SCHNECK & MONAST, supra note 26, at 4.
130 See Chairman Gensler IETA Remarks, supra note 10.
131 Id.
132 JICKLING & PARKER, supra note 39, at 1 (“Regulation of [secondary] emissions trading
would have to consider two kinds of fraud and manipulation: fraud by traders or inter-
mediaries against other investors, and sustained price manipulation, which is harmful
not only to market participants, but potentially to consumers and the economy.”).
133 Id. at 26 (describing what types of manipulation are likely to occur: “[t]he degree to
which fraud on the unwary could be a problem depends on how many and what kinds of
traders are attracted to the market.”).
134 See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22912, THE ENRON LOOPHOLE 2–6
(2008).
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led to dark markets without transparency, and was described by California
State Senator Joseph Dunn as “the greatest fraud ever perpetrated on
the American consumer.”135 Enron’s scams created fake electricity short-
ages that caused the price of electricity to skyrocket, and caused severe
blackouts across the state. In the end, Enron’s scams led to the bankruptcy
of a nearly 100 year old energy utility company.136
The Enron loophole created by the deregulation of California en-
ergy markets allowed over the counter derivatives trading on exempt com-
mercial markets (much like carbon forwards trading on exempt markets)
to avoid CFTC regulation, and the results were historically disastrous.
The 2008 Farm Bill partially closed this loophole by allowing the CFTC
to regulate these trades when it determines that the derivatives play a
significant role in price discovery.137
Whereas Enron provides an example of energy manipulation in
an unregulated market, the “London Loophole” demonstrates that so-
phisticated parties will use any potential regulatory weakness to their
advantage if it aligns with their incentives. The London Loophole was
the regulatory gap that allowed foreign speculators to trade certain
United States registered commodities on exchanges that were registered
in London, thereby avoiding the trading requirements, such as position
limits and reporting, that are required of commodities traded on United
States exchanges.138 The CFTC meeting in July 2012 intended to close
the “Swaps Loophole.”139 This loophole allowed large institutional investors
to “avoid position limits that would be applicable to direct transactions
in the underlying futures.”140
With the California market and the potential for a national car-
bon market, the volume of carbon trading will increase, as will the eco-
nomic impact or any potential fraud or manipulation. There have already
135 See Examining Enron: Developments Regarding Electricity Price Manipulation in
California: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. of the U.S. Senate, 170th Cong.
2 (2002).
136 Id. at 14.
137 CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 8.
138 See Senator Carl Levin, Statement on the Close the London Loophole Act (June 12,
2008), available at http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=dc568712-730d
-4c88-9e8a-a217f7f61fcb.
139 See CFTC Open Meeting, supra note 1.
140 CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48, at 8.
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been examples of abuses in the energy markets,141 and the risk is com-
pounded by the fact that carbon allowances will be reduced over time.
Due to the murky regulatory provision, it is possible that no
single agency would have regulatory oversight of the carbon emissions
market. Instead, major energy regulators would form a regulatory patch-
work to regulate the markets. Even with a patchwork approach, the CFTC
would need to play a pivotal role in regulating the derivative trading and
protect the market from fraud and manipulation.142 Without the over-
sight of the CFTC, it seems likely that sophisticated parties would be able
take advantage of relaxed regulations and slip between the patchwork
scheme of current regulators. The potential for fraud and manipulation
stands directly at odds with the CFTC’s decision to exclude energy markets.
141 See Excessive Speculation and Compliance with Dodd-Frank Act Before the Subcomm.
on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong.
1 (2011) (statement of Tyson Slocum, Director, Public Citizen’s Energy Program) [here-
inafter Tyson Slocum Testimony] (describing abuses in energy trading: “Energy traders
like Goldman Sachs are investing and acquiring energy infrastructure assets because
controlling pipelines and storage facilities affords their energy trading affiliates an
‘insider’s peek’ into the physical movements of energy products unavailable to other
energy traders. . . . The Wall Street Journal reported that financial speculators were
snapping up leasing rights in Cushing, Ok.11. . . . Armed with this non-public data, a
company like Goldman Sachs most certainly will open lines of communication between
the affiliates operating pipelines and the affiliates making large bets on energy futures
markets. Without strong firewalls prohibiting such communications, consumers would
be susceptible to price-gouging by energy trading affiliates.”).
142 See JICKLING & PARKER, supra note 39, at 1 (“The Commodities Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC) currently oversees the Title IV program and its mission most closely
resembles what a regulator of a future carbon market would do, including market sur-
veillance to prevent or detect fraud and manipulation. The major weakness of the CFTC,
according to some, is that it lacks resources and the statutory mandate to do its job.
Current derivatives reform proposals would greatly enlarge its regulatory scope. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is much larger than the CFTC, but it also
faces resource and capability issues. While the CO2 market will resemble commodities
markets more closely than securities, SEC has some appropriate regulatory tools appli-
cable to an emissions market.
EPA would likely be responsible for the primary market in allowances. However,
EPA lacks experience comparable to that of the CFTC and SEC in regulating trading
markets, although the data it gathered in the primary market could be critical to over-
sight of the secondary market.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was granted oversight authority
over bulk electricity and interstate natural gas markets in 2005. Its experience with mar-
ket surveillance and enforcement is thus limited in comparison to the SEC and CFTC,
and it does not play an active role in overseeing the Title IV market.”).
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CONCLUSION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act was a direct response to the recession that occurred in the late
2000s.143 The Act marked the largest and most significant regulation of
the financial industry since the great depression, and its sweeping effect
impacts nearly all of the financial and regulatory agencies in the United
States.144 The explicit purpose of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act is to protect consumers and financial markets
from manipulation.145 One of the ways the Act accomplishes this task is
by bringing financial swaps—the financial instruments at the heart of the
financial crisis—under the regulation of the United States Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.146 The goal of the regulation is to bring
greater transparency to the markets so that it will be harder to manipu-
late,147 the idea being that transparency will bring about greater effi-
ciency and stability. Other methods of reform include: creating new
agencies to monitor financial stability within the country,148 improving
the transparency of financial markets, new participation requirements
for market participants,149 new compliance requirements for financial
institutions,150 and greater protections for investors.151 The goal clearly
is to prevent both systemic risk and manipulation/fraud in the market-
place. The result of the balancing test, comparative test, and result of the
potential calamity that could result make it clear that this goal should
143 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
144 See Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape,
WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704682604575369030
061839958?mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10
001424052748704682604575369030061839958.html (last updated July 16, 2010, 12:01 AM).
145 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
146 Id. (Title VII of the act describes the extensive new requirements for over the counter
derivatives.).
147 Id.
148 CARBON MARKET DESIGN AND OVERSIGHT, supra note 48.
149 See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (describing the new requirements for participation in the
swaps markets).
150 Id.
151 Id.
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extend to current and future carbon markets. These are all concerns that
the CFTC knew about; however, it ignored the Working Group and its
recommendation, and by doing so CFTC deregulation has already begun
to weaken the carbon markets.152
152 See Tyson Slocum Testimony, supra note 141 (“The Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000 deregulated energy trading, undermining CFTC authority over broad swaths
of the market and ushering an explosion in volume in unregulated OTC markets and
underregulated electronic exchanges, or Exempt Commercial Markets (ECMs)—as evi-
denced by one such entity, ICE, which operates both as an ECM as an OTC market oper-
ator. ICE’s electronic exchange volume increased 826% from 2004 to 2010 (from 35 million
contracts to 329 million) and the company’s OTC platform has seen volume grow 976%,
from 31 million contracts in 2004 to 333 million in 2010. The bulk of the ‘speculators’ are
financial institutions, such as Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase/Bear Stearns, Morgan
Stanley and Bank of America/Merrill Lynch. Such firms have turned energy markets into
lucrative profit centers for the firms, taking full advantage of the lack of regulatory over-
sight over their operations to maximize market power and control information.”).
